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Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The
Chilean Case After Dictatorship
Jorge Correa S."
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to include this subject in a volume on dispute reso-
lution, one must understand dispute resolution in a broad sense.
We will be focusing on a government that succeeds a dictatorship
and, while in the transition to a democracy, confronts the prob-
lem of past human rights violations. What the new government
faces is not exactly, by common definition, a dispute among actual
parties that has to be settled by a third one. Nevertheless, with
this phenomenon there are, as in dispute resolutions, very intense
and competing expectations. Expectations that range from. com-
plete impunity to direct revenge. The issue raises high fears and
no less intense desires. As one of the relatives declared to the.
Commission, "I felt happiness and sadness when [President]
Aylwin won. I knew that an era was coming to an end, the one of
silence; but a more difficult era was starting, the need and the
obligation to do something."'
Dealing with the problem of past human rights violations in
periods of transition to democracy is probably one of the most
complex situations a politician must face. It entangles in an insep-
arable way very difficult ethical, political, and technical issues,
none of which offers a simple answer. Competing goals are often
desirable, like those of bringing about peace and reconciliation to
a highly divided society. Such a goal may require some degree of
amnesty; the same amnesty may be needed in order to keep some
of the public officers that served the old regime in office. 2 On
* Professor of Law, Diego Portales University Law School, Santiago, Chile. Former
Secretary (Chief of Staff) of the National Commission' for Truth and Reconciliation.
1 SEcRrARiA DE COMISi6N Y CULTURA, MINISTERIO SECRETRIA GRAL DE GOBIERNO,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 785 (1991)
[hereinafter REPORT]. All translations from Spanish to English of the report are made by
the Article's author. They are probably different from the translation of the full report
that the Notre Dame Law School will make by professional translators.
2 Many of these issues have been discussed in the recent transitions from authori-
tarian regimes to democratic ones, both in Latin America and in Eastern Europe.
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the other hand, complete and severe punishments may be the way
to destroy the organization that violated those rights, or the best
way to prevent future violations. It would be easy to say that nor-
mative principles must prevail, yet, in order to achieve them, they
need to be prudently balanced with expediency. "Everybody is
aware of the ambiguities of transitional periods, where measures
which are straightforward from the standpoint of human rights
norms, could have undesired political implications which, in turn,
would affect human rights adversely."'
The way statesmen deal with this issue is decisive as to the
way democracy consolidates, the way legitimacy may be claimed,
and in the very future of human rights. In the southern cone of
Latin America, and especially in the transition of Uruguay, Argen-
tina, and Chile, the manner in which the first elected government
has dealt with past human rights violations has been so entangled
with political transition that it is difficult to talk about one without
having to deal with the other.4 This relationship is not merely an
accident, and one could try to explain it in many ways. For the
purpose of our topic, I will propose some keys for understanding
the Chilean case. I think it is impossible to look at what has been
happening with past human rights violations if one does not bear
in mind the characteristics and conditions under which that
transition was made possible.
I will then focus on some of the characteristics of the Chilean
transition to democracy. Then, I will focus on each of the goals of
the report of the National Commission and shortly discuss the
degree to which they were achieved. Finally, I will look at the
Chilean situation as a case study about the merits and shortcom-
ings of truth as a factor in a "dispute resolution" of this sort.
3 Jose Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments:
Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in STATE CRIMES, PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 25
(1989). This Article follows closely Zalaquett's thought as expressed in the aforemen-
tioned work.
4 For a very good comparative analysis of this topic, see id. For a description of the
Argentinean situation, see Carlos Acufia & Catalina Smultovitz, ENi Olvido Ni Perdon?
Derechos Humanos y Tensiones Civico-Militares en la Transicion Argentina (1991) (un-
published paper, on file with the author). See also Jaime Malamud-Goti, Tiying riolators of
Human Rights: The Dilemma of Transitional Democratic Governments, in STATE CRIMES, supra
note 3; Carlos S. Nino, The Human Rights Policy of the Argentine Constitutional Government: A
Reply, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 217 (1985).
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II. TRANSITION To DEMOCRACY
A. Introduction
There can be no doubt, as already suggested, that political
conditions limit a government that succeeds a dictatorship as to
the kind of policies it can follow when dealing with past human
rights violations. The goals, from a normative standpoint may be
exactly the same, yet, the actual possibilities of achieving them and
the best strategies to do so may be very different. A new govern-
ment that had a military victory over those who had participated
in gross human rights violations (like Nicaragua) is very different
from an elected government that had to collaborate for a long
time with the very same guerrillas that were responsible for past
human rights violations in 'order to continue to fight a common
enemy (like El Salvador). In the Nicaraguan example, there are
no political restrictions, and the only dangers that the new author-
ities face are probably the excesses that one can commit when
trying the cases in the courts. In the El Salvador example, howev-
er, attempting to keep the army and the police within the bound-
aries of civilian rule and forcing them to respect human rights are
the only things that can be done.
Between these two extremes are cases like Greece and Argen-
tina where the armed forces left power after a moral collapse,
both because of internal political discontent and because they had
lost an external war. Uruguay illustrates a negotiated transition
after the armed forces suffered a political defeat; and, of course,
less could be achieved in the Uruguayan case than in the Argen-
tinean one.' Time is also a very important factor. It is of course a
very different situation when the democratic authorities gain pow-
er shortly after the massive violations of human rights have been
committed, than the case, like Spain, where there is a totally new
generation in the most influential positions.
In the Chilean situation, the political constraints were great,
and the newly elected government thought that it did not have
enough power to bring about punishment. Therefore, acknowl-
edgement became its policy. It thought that a full disclosure of an
official truth would help to achieve the three moral objectives that
the government perceived as its basic and unavoidable obligations:
5 Supra notes 3-4.
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(1) to do as much as it could to build a solid and preventive
barrier against future human rights violations; (2) to compensate,
as much as possible, the survivors that had been most severely
damaged; and (3) to bring about reconciliation.
This Article first examines the character of the political con-
straints that made it impossible for the new government to impose
a policy of penal sanctions. The Article then highlights some of
the more important relations between that policy of social ac-
knowledgement and the three principles that it sought to achieve.
B. A Plebiscite Where the Ruling Junta
Loses (Though Not Everything)
In the case of the Chilean transition, it was not so much the
threat of another coup that made it difficult for the new govern-
ment to impose sanctions, but rather the way it achieved- power
and the expectations it created. The opposition to the military
regime had been active and mobilized in the early 1980's, but it
could not overthrow the authoritarian government. Neither the
peaceful strategy of civil disobedience nor the most violent acts,
ranging from street riots to attempts to kill General Pinochet,
were successful enough to overthrow the regime.6 Nevertheless, in
order to stay in power, the authoritarian regime had to allow
some civil liberties, and that liberalization made the final differ-
ence. After the democratic political parties failed to remove
Pinochet by other means, they viewed the 1988 plebiscite as the
only opportunity to beat the military rulers. Yet, the price they
had to pay was high, and the democratic coalition could not eat
the sweet without tasting the bitter.
In order to compete in that plebiscite, the democratic politi-
cal parties had to accept -the Constitution of 1980, and they had
to promise that they would only change it according to its own
rules.7 This Constitution established the calling of the plebiscite
and regulated what should happen after the plebiscite. In order to
6 REPoRT, supra note 1, at 665-709. For a good source of information about the
political atmosphere of those years, see ASCANjO CAVALLO, HISTORIA OCULTA DEL REGIMEN
MIIrAR (Antartica ed., 1989).
7 The decision to accept the constitutional order as a given was highly contested
among the democratic political parties for a long. The discussion took place first in the
Christian Democratic party, where Aylwin's group made this an important point. This
decision was even more contested among the Socialists. Only the Communists resisted
entering the political process through this means and were left outside the political coali-
tion that fought together in the plebiscite and the subsequent presidential election.
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win the- plebiscite, the democratic forces had to be very prudent.
A large part of the population feared that the return of democra-
cy could bring disorder and chaos, threatening the peace and
economic progress that the country was experiencing. Because
their vote could be decisive, the democratic parties had to promise
full respect for the Pinochet institutional framework and that they
would only change that framework through its own mechanisms.
The democratic political forces had to inaugurate a new polit-
ical rhetoric that was not as confrontational. As a result, the hu-
man rights issue was strongly presented as a demand to encourage
pacification and depolarization rather than as a demand for pun-
ishment.8 The slogans chosen for the campaign in the plebiscite
offer a good example: "Chile, happiness is already on its way" or
"Without fear, without hatred, vote no." Another one of those
slogans stated, " You only need a pencil to beat Pinochet."
As a result, the democratic forces not only won the plebiscite,
but their new strategies were the key factor to victory and left
indelible marks in, the characteristics of the Chilean transition to
democracy and the period of consolidation. From the moment of
Pinochet's defeat in the plebiscite, the acceptance' of the rules and
the institutional scheme that had been created by the armed forc-
es began to work to the advantage of the democratic parties. The
Constitution stipulated that a general election was to be held in
one year, and there was no doubt that the same forces that had
defeated Pinochet could defeat any other person that would be
seen as his candidate. Moreover, from the night after the plebi-
scite of October 1988, the possibility that the army could break its
own rules and try to avoid future elections was the only real threat
to the transition to democracy. So, surprisingly enough, it was the
democratic groups who were caring about the maintenance of the
Constitution enacted by the ruling Junta and its scheduled plan to
recover democracy.
Of course, there were broad and well structured provisions in
that constitutional and legal scheme that were designed to ensure
that the new democratic forces would not make radical changes to
the Constitution. The democratic parties could not take only one
part of those rules, decide to play according to Pinochet's consti-
tutional scheme, and then try to change the Constitution accord-
8 For a general description of this campaign, see EUGENIO TIRONI, LA INVISIBLE
VICTORIA (Sur ed., 1990).
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ing to their own rules. Yet, between the plebiscite and the presi-
dential election, negotiations were held for the first time to repeal
some of the most important of those authoritarian devices em-
bodied in the Constitution. Unfortunately,' only a limited number
of agreements was reached. They were approved by another plebi-
scite with 87.7% of popular support.9 The rest of the well-de-
signed authoritarian structure remained.
C. The Issue of Human Rights During
the Presidential Campaign
The discussion of human rights was very important during the
Presidential campaign that followed Pinochet's defeat in the plebi-
scite. The democratic forces had Aylwin as a candidate, while the
political right and the forces that had supported the military re-
gime backed a civilian, the former Secretary of the Treasury De-
partment, Hacienda. Chilean long-standing tradition is one in
which the candidates are to put forward a program. The coalition
giving support to Aylwin had great difficulty agreeing on how to
deal with past human rights violations. The language of the final
text of the program may express the difficulty in achieving agree-
ment:
The democratic Government will put forth its best efforts in
order to establish the truth in the cases of violations of human
rights that have occurred since September of 1973. It will also
procure the trial according to the actual penal law, of the
human rights violations that represent atrocious crimes against
life, liberty and personal integrity . . ..
The program continued, "Cases are to be tried in civilian courts,
which should act in accordance with the principle of due process
of law, and with full respect of the procedural guarantees of vic-
tims and those held responsible.""' Having in mind the Argentin-
ean case and its problems with the Ley de Punto Final,2 there was
9 The plebiscite was held on July 30, 1989. An overwhelming majority (87.7%) of
the population approved the proposal for reforming the Constitution.
10 PROGRAMA DE GOBIERNO, CONcERTAcI6N DE PARTIDOS POR LA DEMOCRACIA (1989)
(translation by the author of this Article).
11 Id.
12 The Argentinean Ley de Punto Final was enacted on December 24, 1986, after
major manifestations of discontent made by the military. It aimed at limiting the cases of
past human rights violations that would be presented to the courts by limiting the time
in which they could be presented. A large number of cases were brought to the courts
during the established period. However, far from calming the discontent in the armed
[Vol. 67:1455
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a promise to establish a special and limited period to present the
cases to the court. Finally, some very careful words were devoted
in the program to the amnesty law of 1978:
Due to its very legal nature - and true meaning, the amnesty
decree-law of 1978 has not and cannot become an impediment
for, the disclosure of the truth, the investigation of the facts
and the establishment of criminal responsibilities in cases of
crimes against human rights, as are the detention of people
followed by disappearance, crimes against the right to life and
grave physical and psychological wounds. The democratic gov-
ernment will continue the program to promote the derogation
or nullification of the amnesty law.'1
The promise was not to repeal the amnesty law, but to make ef-
forts to achieve that result.
Notwithstanding the careful wording of the program, it quick-
ly came under forceful attack. Both the political right and the
armed forces spoke out. Although the active officers of the armed
forces refrained from making open statements on electoral issues
during the presidential campaign, the Commander in Chief of the
Air Force decided to speak. He was considered to be a key actor
in support of liberalization and a very strong supporter of civilian
rule. He had kept his soldiers away from the secret police and
fired most of the men that were highly compromised in human
rights violations. He was also the first to publicly recognize the
defeat of Pinochet the night after the plebiscite (a very crucial
moment where the government was not publishing the results and
thus creating a tense climate)." This same general, very shortly
after the program was presented, publicly said that repealing the
amnesty law ran against the compromise the democratic parties
had made to respect the institutional scheme. He further asserted
that this represented a threat to the whole process of transition to
democracy. Pinochet, of course, did not'use very elegant words to
say the same thing-announcing that if one of his men was
forces, the cases augmented it. See Zalaquett, supra note 3, at 55; Acufia supra note 4, at
43.
13 PROGRAMA DE GOBIERNO, supra note 10.
14 Some versions argued that the results of the ballot-box were not given by the
government in order to provoke street riots by the people that had voted no, and thus
to regain political control by authoritarian methods. This version was denied by govern-
ment officials. The weekly magazines covered this development the week after the plebi-
scite. See generally Hoy, Oct. 1988; ANALIsS, Oct. 1988; QUE PASA, Oct. 1988; APSI, Oct.
1988.
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touched, the rule of law would end. The democratic forces de-
fended their program during the campaign. They frequently re-
peated that they would not risk a peaceful transition to democra-
cy, that all they had promised in their program was to make ef-
forts to repeal the law, and that obviously, those efforts had their
natural limits in the very stability of the political process.
D. The Final Political Conditions
After the presidential and congressional election in 1989, it
became clear that changing the Constitution and the laws of the
previous regime would not be easy. Although the new government
held a majority in the Lower Chamber, it did not control the
Senate, where nine of the forty-six members were not elected, but
rather, were designated to ensure a conservative, majority coali-
tion. Therefore, the new government had to compromise with at
least one of the right-wing political parties every time it proposed
a legislative or constitutional change.
The newly elected authorities had accepted the institutional
framework that included other strong protection mechanisms that
were impossible to overcome. Among the many was a self-amnesty
law passed in 1978. The new government could not repeal or
invalidate this law because it lacked the legislative majority to do
so. A second inhibiting factor was the ideological sympathies of
the judiciary. The Supreme Court applied the broadest interpreta-
tion possible to the amnesty law, making it difficult even to investi-
gate the truth. The Court also had demonstrated a weak commit-
ment to investigate and punish the cases that occurred after 1978.
Because Pinochet had intervened in the judicial nominations only
in accordance with the 1925 constitutional framework, the new au-
thorities could not just replace the judges.
So Aylwin's problem was not an easy one. On the one hand,
he had a moral obligation to disclose the truth and punish human
rights violators. On the other, he could only achieve the final
results he desired by breaking the very rules that had brought him
into power.
Aylwin addressed the issue of past human rights violations in
his opening speech the day he became President. 15 Until that
15 The inaugural speech was made at the National Public Stadium, March 12, 1990,
and published in all newspapers the next day. See Patricio Aylwin, Inaugural Speech (Mar.
12, 1990) (transcript available at the Secretaria de Cultura y Prensa, Ministerio Secretaria
General de Gobierno).
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point, he had not defined a precise policy beyond its main princi-
ples. In his speech, he called for a compromise between the vir-
tues of morality and prudence, stating clearly that a full disclosure
of the truth was indispensable. His choice seemed to be judicial
trials followed by pardon.1 6 This strategy presented an enormous
problem: the courts clearly would not follow that path and would
continue to interpret the amnesty law as broadly as possible.
The Argentinean experience was close enough in time and
distance to illustrate to Aylwin that even in much more favorable
conditions maximalist policies had to be compromised (e.g.,
Alfonsin had to abandon some of his goals in the midst of open
and violent military resistance) .17 In Chile, a threat to the author-
ity of the civilian president was very dangerous because the unity
of the armed forces is a long standing tradition, and nothing
showed that it had weakened. The political intervention of the
military after the presidential election would have meant nothing
but a coup.
The Uruguayan experience also influenced Aylwin. In Uru-
guay, the democratic forces had also started their transition to
democracy with a plebiscite called and lost by the military rulers.
Unlike the Chilean case, however, Uruguay had no amnesty law.
When the cases were brought to the civilian courts, the officers
openly resisted testifying, claiming that military courts had proper
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court'ruled that the civilian courts had
jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, the newly elected parliament passed
an amnesty law. After that, twenty-five percent of the citizens
signed petitions demanding a plebiscite in order to repeal the
amnesty law. However, the plebiscite upheld the amnesty law.
More than eight years passed between the first and the last of the
aforementioned plebiscites. 8 The Uruguayan experience taught
many Chileans to do quickly whatever had to be done.
In this environment of political restrictions, Chile's new dem-
ocratic government believed that its basic moral obligations of
prevention, compensation for the victims, and reconciliation could
be met through an official disclosure of the truth. Accordingly,
the Government created the Commission for Truth and Reconcili-
ation.
16 Td.
17 See supra note 4 for a general description of this situation in Argentina.
18 See Zalaquett, supra note 3.
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III. THE FINAL STRATEGY: THE COMMISSION OF
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, ITS
OBJECTIVES AND THE OUTCOMES
A. The Creation of the Commission
Within its first month in office, the government started private
conversations in order to establish a commission that would inves-
tigate and disclose the truth regarding human rights violations. It
soon became clear that the forces of the right, now in the opposi-
tion but controlling the Senate, would not follow such a strategy.
During the electoral campaign, the opposition had claimed that
remembering old wounds and divisions would not benefit Chilean
society. They had also argued that only the courts could properly
conduct such investigations. Nevertheless, some voices among the
coalition supporting the new government argued in favor of an
investigative commission of the House of Deputies.
Aylwin decided to create the Commission by presidential de-
cree. He personally tried to integrate people from the right into
the Commission. Although no member of the right-wing parties
joined, some important and well-reputed, conservatives accepted.
Aylwin drafted the plan and discussed it with those who accepted.
On April 24, 1990, the creation of the Commission was an-
nounced, less than two months after the new government had
taken office.1
9
The remainder of this Article tries to explain the goals that
the Commission tried to achieve, noting its successes and short-
comings. In so doing, the Article examines both those things that
truth can achieve in like situations and those goals that are unat-
tainable. Some of this we understood from the very moment the
Commission was created; some, we came to realize along the way
or in the aftermath of these experiences.
B. What Kind of Truth
1. Universal or General
The decree that created the Commission," after stating that
19 The announcement of the Commission was made in a solemn and public act on
the night Aylwins' speech had been published in all the newspapers. An official version
has been edited by the Secretaria de Comunicaci6n y Cultura, Ministerio Secretaria de
General del Gobierno.
20 Ministry of the Interior Decree No. 355, DIAIUo OFICIAL (May 9, 1990). See also
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the moral consciousness of the nation required the truth about
past human rights violations, established that the truth about indi-
vidual cases would not alone allow a general appreciation of what
had happened. Accordingly, the Commission attempted to realize
the following goals: (1) obtain an account of methods, policies,
and excuses for human rights violations; (2) procure a history of
the reactions of the different relevant sectors of society; and (3)
attempt to explain the causes of such violations and their conse-
quences for the victims, their relatives, and society. The Commis-
sion thought that these goals would provide a beneficial exercise
for the sanity of social conscience and that the public exposure of
the truth would have a special cathartic effect. Judicial investiga-
tion of particular cases clearly would not achieve these goals.
21
The final report of the Commission tries to state all these
characteristics. It tries to explain the political, legal, and judicial
conditions that made the violation of human rights possible.22
For each period studied, one can read the organization, the
methods of acting, and the impunity of the violators of human
rights. 23 Special attention is paid to torture. A description of the
reactions of the most relevant social, political, and moral forces
inside and outside the country is also stated for every period.24
Finally, the report, in one of its most moving chapters, describes
the suffering and the expectations of the victim's relatives, using
their own words and statements. 5
2. The Individual Case by Case Story
The Commission's aim was not only to achieve a general
truth, but also to reach the truth concerning individual cases.
There are two reasons for this. First, the only way to convincingly
infer or explain a general truth, as previously described, is
through the actual, individual cases. of human rights violations.
Second, because there were no real possibilities of judicial inves-
REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-10.
21 For a general analysis of the judicial behavior during the authoritarian years, see
REPORT, supra note 1, at 95-104. &e also Jorge Correa, Formaci6n de Jueces para la
Democrada, in FILOSOFIA DEL DERECHO Y DEMOCRACIA EN IBERO-AMtRICA 34-35 (Agustin
Squella ed., 1992); Hugo Fruhling, Justicia y Violacion de Derechos Humanos en Chile
(1987) (unpublished paper on file with author).
22 REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-104.
23 Id. at 107-764.
24 .d at 441-48, 606-15, 745-64.
25 Id. at 766-85.
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26tigation in many of the cases, some minimal justice had to be
done in individual cases. Because authorities had neglected past
violations, the relatives of those victims needed some kind of offi-
cial recognition. As one of them said to us, "They told me that he
had been freed. Now we find him in the tomb, with his eyes
blindfolded and his hands bound."27 Another said, "I want to cry
out to the world, and with pride, that my father died because of
his ideals. I want society to finally understand that the sons and
daughters of those, they killed are not dangerous people."2' As
these words demonstrate, the individual truth was important to re-
establishing the dignity of the victims and their relatives.A
Of course, one of the most important goals of the Commis-
sion was to disclose the ,truth about the missing people. As one of
the members of the Commission stated concerning disappearance:
This kind of human rights violation is "a method of repression
which, by its very nature, rests on secrecy and perpetuates its per-
nicious effects as long as truth remains hidden.""0 A mother of
one missing person told us that after more than fifteen years, she
still keeps the door of the house open during every holiday so
that her disappeared son can come in. As a sister of another vic-
tim told us, "On every windy night my mother thought that it was
him coming back. She would walk up, open the door, and cry."3"
In order to achieve this individual truth, the Commission
called the relatives of those persons who had been killed or were
missing to present their cases and asked anyone with relevant
information on any case to testify. Special requests were sent to
the groups that had done human rights work in the past and to
those who were named as being responsible for past human rights
violations.32
The final report includes the individual history of each of the
2,279 cases in which a moral conviction was achieved, meaning
that a human rights violation had resulted in a death or disap-
26 Since the report was delivered, the courts have made significant advances in the
investigation of a very few but highly symbolic cases. For example, Manuel Contreras, the
former chief of the secret police, was tried for the assassination of Orlando Letelier in
Washington D.C. in September 1976.
27 RFPORT, supra note 1, at 781.
28 Id. at 785.
29 The recovery of the dignity of the victims was one of the established goals the
Commission had to achieve. See Ministry of the Interior Decree No. 355, supra note 20.
30 Zalaquett, supra note 3, at 30.
31 REPORT, supra note 1, at 770.
32 For a complete description of the methods of the Commission, see id. at 3-13.
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pearance after detention. The report also briefly states the reasons
for such a conviction so that readers will be able to form their
own opinion. In 641 cases, the Commission could not definitively
conclude that a human rights violation had actually occurred, and
another special commission is now being created to decide such
cases."3 As explained later, another 508 cases presented to the
Commission were outside of its jurisdiction.
The series of explanations that the report establishes for dis-
tinguishing among cases may interest human rights scholars. 
4
Probably the most important is the line drawn between those who
died as victims of political violence and those who were victims of
human rights violations. In the first group are those who were
killed in the midst of the few combats that followed the military
takeover and lasted only a few hours. Also considered as victims of
political violence instead of human rights violations are those
persons killed in the episodic armed conflicts between the police
and the armed groups of the left. The report gives other concep-
tual considerations to explain the criteria applied to those who
committed suicide while in prison. The principles used in other
cases are more difficult to categorize.
The Commission largely failed to know and disclose the actual
destiny of the missing people. In some thousand cases, the mem-
bers of the Commission did arrive at the moral conviction that a
person was missing and that either state officials were responsible
for the initial arrest, or there was enough indirect evidence to
point to state involvement." Nevertheless, there was not enough
collaboration on the part of former human rights violators to find
out exactly when and how the missing people were killed and
where their remains could be found. People that had played mi-
nor roles in the early months of the repression by the military
regime did disclose some of that information either to us or other
human rights groups. After that initial period, however, only a
small number of highly trained and loyal men and women were
involved in killing operations. Their methods also became much
more sophisticated, both as to the secrecy of the ways of arresting
the victim and to the way of disposing of the bodies of those
33 DIARIo OFIciAL § 19.123 (Feb. 8, 1992) (creating this new Commission called
Comisi6n Nacional de Reparaci6n y Reconciliaci6n).
34 REPORT, supra note 1, at 27-30.
35 Id. at 107-763.
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killed.3 6 As a result, much less is known about this period. Actual-
ly, only a couple of those involved with the secret police decided
to testify before the Commission. Sending this information to the
courts was difficult because we knew that the secrecy of those
testimonies could no longer be guaranteed. Because some of the
testimonies we received were given to us under the condition of
secrecy, we had to protect them while still sending the relevant
information so that the court could find and excavate the bodies.
Yet, most of the cases of missing people have not been re-
solved, leaving an open wound in Chilean society. A special new
commission is now being created in the country to continue with
that work,3 7 a mission that the Catholic Church, through the
Vicaria de la Solidaridad, is continuing to develop.
3. Authoritative Truth that Could No Longer be Contested
The Commission certainly was not the first group in Chile to
investigate or report human rights violations. A wide range of such
reports had already been published, both by national and interna-
tional organizations." Moreover, the work of the Commission
would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, if the
documents and files of human rights groups had not been made
available to us (especially the ones of the Vicaria de la
Solidaridad, an organization created by the churches and sustained
by the Catholic Church)." The Commission did not take these
reports for granted. In many cases, the Commission could add
more information to the reports by extracting data from public
records to which the Commission had legal access. In other cases,
36 Id. at 478-84.
37 DIARIO OricIAL, supra note 33.
38 Among the most internationally known reports about human rights in Chile is
Report on Human Rights in Chie, INTER-AM. C.H.R. (Sept. 1985) (photocopy of original
Spanish version on file with the author).
The United Nations published many reports during the Chilean dictatorship. Espe-
cially important were the reports published from 1979-1989, which where elaborated upon
by the special rapporteur.
In its annual report, Amnesty International analyzed Chile in several instances. For
information about the human rights violations during the dictatorship, see reports of
1979-1989, published both in English and Spanish.
39 The Vicaria de la Solidaridad and its predecessor organization, the Comit6 de
Cooperaci6n para la Paz en Chile, have documented tens of thousands of cases of viola-
tions .of human rights in Chile. This organization presented its cases to the courts and
had the most complete files on the subject. Most of them were made available to the
Commission.
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the data of the Vicaria was a very useful starting point for our
own investigations.
The Church had already published part of its information,
and some journalists had published books with many of the most
relevant cases. Those publications had already become long-stand-
ing best sellers.4" Legal and illegal copies were sold at bookstores,
newsstands, and on the streets in all the cities and towns through-
out the country. In this respect the Chilean transition was quite
unique.
There are several reasons why a country should need a special
commission to search for a truth that was- quite widespread. First,
none of the previous reports had tried a comprehensive coverage
of the entire period in its generalities, and none had tried to
cover all the individual cases. I have argued the importance of
both. Second, and more importantly, all the previous disclosures
were highly contested, even the ones deriving from the Church or
from international forums. One has to remember that for a long
time, and certainly for the time during which the magsive viola-
tions of human rights were committed, the regime had absolute
control over the press. So, for a long lime, the killing and kidnap-
ping of political dissidents was reported as being an invention of
the Communist Party and its satellite groups who simply could not
accept the fact that they had lost their power in Chile after their
democratic experiment had finished in total chaos. Even the Presi-
dent of the Supreme Court advanced this explanation when refer-
ring to the writs of habeas corpus that were presented to the
courts. 41 The propaganda of the regime could prove that some
40 The most prominent example is probably PATRICIA VERDUGO, LOS ZARPAZOS DEL
PUNA (America Cesoc ed., 1989). Another big best-seller was EUGENIO AHUMADA, CHILE
LA MEMORIA PROHIBIDA (Pehuen ed., 1989).
41 According to article 5 of the CMvL CODE, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
has to give an opening speech at the beginning of each year. In 1975 the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court stated:
Chile, which is not a land of barbarians, as it is often said abroad, either by
bad chileans or by foreigners has made diligent efforts to comply strictly with
these rights. As to torture and other atrocities, I can say that here there are no
walls where executions are committed and no Berlin wall, and any information
in that sense is due to a political media compromised with ideas that have not
and will not prosper in our country.
DIARIo OFICIAL (Mar. 14, 1975) (translation by author of this Article). Then, the Chief
Justice discounted the fact that there were people missing in Chile, and went on to say
that:
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Communists were working at the Catholic Church's Vicaria de la
Solidaridad, so they made the argument that the organization had
been infiltrated and was dominated by the Communists.42 Addi-
tionally, the regime attempted to discredit the stories of human
rights violations that human rights groups were publishing by
producing untrue stories about millions of people killed by the
military regime and its secret police.
Aylwin, therefore, needed to appoint people to the Commis-
sion that the whole country would trust. He needed moral figures
that could be trusted from the right to the left and especially by
the relatives of the victims. Finding men and women that had
taken a brave stand in defense of human rights and that had per-
sonally suffered for taking such a position so that the left and the
human rights groups could trust them was not difficult. The prob-
lem was to find people on the right side of the political spectrum,
especially after the right-wing parties had denied their collabora-
tion. Aylwin made personal efforts in this. Finally, some well-reput-
ed, conservative scholars accepted, including a former member of
the Supreme Court and a former secretary of State of the
Pinochet government.
The problem then became that of split votes. A dissenting
opinion could deprive the report of all its value, or, even worse,
two reports was a possible outcome. Fortunately, all the members
became highly involved in the investigation of the cases. They
personally heard many testimonies and checked the evidence. The
final outcome was reached unanimously, and there is not a single
dissenting opinion in the report.
4
The report has not been recognized as the truth by the
armed forces or the Supreme Court. Each branch of the armed
forces answered the report separately and in quite different terms.
The army, in a solemn act with Pinochet speaking, denied the
truth of the Commission, arguing that it was partial (because not
[T]he Appellate Court in Santiago and the Supreme Court had both been pes-
tered in their work by the numerous habeas corpus presented to them, on the
pretexts of arrests ordered by the Executive. This has disrupted the work of the
Courts, interfering with their duty to occupy themselves on the urgent matters
of their jurisdiction.
Id.
42 REPORT, supra note 1, at 608. (Pinochet sent a letter dated November 11, 1975,
to the Archbishop of Santiago, Cardinal Silva Henriquez, requesting the dissolution of the
Comite Pro Paz and arguing it was an instrument for the Marxists).
43 Not all the cases were solved unanimously. The differences were not important
enough for the members to state them in the report.
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enough attention was paid to the state of war in the country), that
it was unilateral (because it only considered the victim's version),
and that it was biased (as an attack on the armed forces and their
patriotic contribution to peace and order)." Yet, not one single
case or fact was contested as being untrue. The critics could only
single out some of the more general interpretations or recommen-
dations established in the report. The facts remain uncontested, a
point that the government strongly argued in response to the
army's statement. As I will argue later, a positive recognition by
the critics of the report would have been of enormous impor-
tance.
4. An Official Truth
An effort for an authoritative truth needed an official com-
mission. It also was important that the commission be a state enti-
ty because of the political significance it represented. It was the
same state that had violated human rights in the past and was
now hearing the cases and gathering the information. This state
role was especially important for the relatives of the victims. Al-
though they have had access to nongovernmental organizations
and international commissions and had received their support and
comfort, the relatives pointed out that those were not official enti-
ties. As one relative said, "I don't want to have secret consultations
any more." 5 The Chilean flag was at the entrance of our build-
ing and on top of every desk where a testimony was given. The
same flag that was used so many times by the propaganda of the
military was being recovered. It was a first reparation to their long
standing feeling of marginality. "We feel like exiles in our own
land,"' were the words used by one of them to express this com-
mon feeling.
44 The army, in its final declaration, stated its fundamental disagreement with the'
report of the Commission and denied its historical and legal value. See EL MERCURIO,
Mar. 28, 1991. The navy said that the situation in Chile during the coup was that of a
virtual civil war and denies the value of the report because of its procedures, saying that
the Commission recognized that not all gave their version of what had happened. Id. For
an answer of the police, see EL MERCURIO, Mar. 29, 1991.
45 REPORT, supra note 1, at 785.
46 Id. at 780.
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5. Publicly Exposed
For all this effort to have some meaning, it was indispensable
that the report be made public. Only one single copy of the re-
port was released to the President, who read it during his summer
vacations in 1991. He made the entire report public on March 4,
1991. It was fully published in a newspaper the very next day.
Many new reprints were made and sold in the streets during the
next several months. Finally, a three volume book appeared in the
bookstores. A private group of politicians, scholars, and people
related to cultural activities edited a short summary of the report
in order to make a public campaign for its acknowledgement and
discussion. That very short summary was translated into English
4
1
and French. The Center for Civil and Human Rights at the Notre
Dame Law School is currently translating the full report into Eng-
lish.
The collected records and data have been kept secret to this
day. The Commission for Reconciliation, an institution recently
established by law, will dispose of them.
Whether the Commission should have published the names of
the individuals that had actually committed the violations of rights
was a publicly discussed issue. The Commission understood that it
could not do so. As a special entity different from a court, it was
clear from the beginning that it lacked the authority to try the
violators, a right that only the preestablished courts could per-
form.49 Because a full trial with due guarantees was not conduct-
ed in every case, the Commission understood that it could not dis-
close names. Instead, the Commission stated in every conviction
that public officials had intervened, and their membership is fre-
quently identified as if they were part of a branch of the armed
forces or of the secret police. The Commission also published the
places where people were killed or tortured, but the names of
violators were not publicly disclosed."
47 DIARio LA NACION, Mar. 5, 1991.
48 CHILEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, To BELIEVE IN CHILE (Jean Becker trans.,
1992).
49 Decree No. 355 clearly states that it should not perform judicial functions. See
supra note 17; see also CHILE CONST. arL 19, no. 3 (1980) (guaranteeing that nobody can
be tried by special commissions, but only by courts created by law).
50 For a more complete explanation, see REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-30.
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6. Quick and, Thus, Limited
The official truth could not be delayed for too long, or both
its importance and impact would have been severely diminished.
The Commission was given six months to deliver its report, with a
possible extension of three more months, which it used. In such a
time period it would have been impossible to issue a statement
that addressed all the cases of human rights violations that had
occurred in the country during seventeen years of military govern-
ment. It would have been impossible, not only because of the
number of cases, but it also would, have been difficult to distin-
guish what should have been counted as a human rights violation.
The President decided that the Commission should only investi-
gate the cases resulting in the death or the disappearance of the
victim, and those cases where the Commission concluded that the
state was morally responsible because of the involvement of a
public official or a person working for the government. The Presi-
dent also decided to include one other type of case: those killed
for political reasons. This meant that the Commission also had to
report, the actions of the guerrilla and liberation movements re-
sponsible for someone's death."' This was criticized by some hu-
man rights scholars, who argued that considering political crimes
not committed by the state as human rights violations on the
same level as the others was a great mistake because it deprived
the notion of violation of human rights of its force. The Commis-
sion was careful in saying that cases could not be compared and
that they were different in many ways. 2 I would certainly argue
today that it was politically important to, include those cases.
In choosing only to investigate and disclose the truth about
the people killed or missing, the government not only selected the
most dramatic situations, but in so doing it also chose to focus on
the truth that was more clearly denied by the human rights viola-
tors. Others, like exiles, restrictions on the press, and violations on
socio-economic rights, were not denied but excused as justified
under the emergency conditions. Torture was also denied. Only
because of time constraints could it be considered legitimate to
leave the individual cases of torture aside. The report made an
effort to generally describe the practice of torture and illustrated
51 Id. at 432-441, 602-06, 665-701.
52 Id. at 17-19.
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its explanations with some examples.5 3 The report of the Com-
mission only incidentally refers to those who lost their jobs for
political reasons, suffered major physical or psychological injuries,
had to go to exile, or were kept in prisons for long time without
charges.
IV. WHY THE TRUTH?
I will consider now the importance of publicly disclosing an
official truth, and its impact on the goals of prevention, cpmpensa-
tion, and reconciliation, the three issues considered by the demo-
cratic government as the basic moral obligations that it could not
compromise. I will start by focusing on prevention and its relation
to penal sanctions.
A. Truth and Prevention: Truth as a
Lesser Alternative of Punishment
It is commonly accepted by legal doctrine that the goal of
penal sanctions are retributive and preventive. The first is highly
contested as a desirable end in society, while the second is gener-
ally accepted.
1. Retribution
The retributive function of penal sanctions is illustrated by the
classic examples of Kant, in which he argues that criminals should
even be punished by a society living on an island that decides to
dissolve itself. 4 According to this theory, penal sanctions have a
moral, autonomous, and obligatory character. When applying this
theory to militarily imposed human rights violations, however,
major problems arise. According to this theory, all wrongdoers
should be punished. This would severely restrict the theory of due
obedience to superior orders. This is not to claim that the theory
is wrong or morally illegitimate. Yet, it illustrates the difficulties of
fully complying with Kant's theory when there are political restric-
tions.55 Moreover, even if one is not dealing with human rights
53 For the concept of torture used by the Commission, see id. at 25. For a descrip-
tion of the practices of torture during the different periods, see id. at 111-14, 478-83,
651-53.
54 IMANUEL KANT, DIE METAPHYSIK DER SrrEN (F. Nicolovious Koenisberg ed., 1797).
55 An interesting analysis of this topic related to the Argentinean situation can be
found in Luis Moreno Ocampo, Justicia y Derechos Humanos Balance y Futuro,
C.E.D.E.S. (1991) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
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violations during transitions to democracy, one would have to
recognize that in any given system, only a minority of the crimes
committed are actually punished by the state.
The only way that an outcome can be consistent with the
goals that the retributive theory assigns to penal sanctions is obvi-
ously through judicial application of prison sentences. One cannot
meet them through other ways, and the Chilean results could not
be justified in these terms.
2. Prevention
Utilitarian arguments justifying criminal sanctions have nor-
mally considered its preventive character. This preventive character
may be achieved because of the following: First, the society pro-
tects itself from the wrongdoers by keeping them in jail; second, it
avoids future criminal actions committed by the wrongdoer
through the threat that the actual sanction poses to him or her;
third, it may rehabilitate the criminal through some kind of spe-
cialized treatment; fourth, potential, future wrongdoers may be
persuaded not to act considering the costs they can be obliged to
pay by way of the penal sanctions; and fifth, the criminal sanction
reinforces the desired values in the general community.
5 6
It can be argued that any of the first three reasons may be,
convincing in dealing with human rights violations committed by a
military regime. They are all reasons directed at preventing future
crimes by the actual criminals that have already committed them. I
will not argue that those who committed the human rights viola-
tions in Chile, and especially those who planned and directed
them, have no personal responsibility in doing so. Yet, I would
argue that if one accepts preventing criminals from future crimi-
nal actions as the goal of criminal punishment, then, sending
human rights violators to a jail is not a very effective device. I
think it is generally accepted that these people cannot be rehabili-
tated through special treatments. Their commitment to crime is
largely due to ideological fanaticism. Nor is it convincing that
their future criminal action would be dissuaded by their actual
imprisonment. Except for very few cases, they will violate human
56 H.LA. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILfTY (1968); Jost ANT6N ONECA, LA
PREvENcI6N GENERAL Y LA PREVENCI6N ESPECIAL EN LA TEORiA DE LA PENA (1945); SANTI-
AGO MIR PUIG, DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL (1984). For a more recent discussion
about the role of criminal punishment in Latin America, see EUGENIO RAOL ZAFFARONI,
EN BUSCA DE LAS PENAS PERDIDAS (1989).
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rights again only if they recover political power. And under such
conditions human rights violations would again be granted impuni-
ty. The preventive theory in this area is related not so much with
the past wrongdoers, but with the conditions that made it possible.
The two other arguments of the preventive theory are directed
towards those conditions.
The last two reasons justifying the preventive theory of punish-
ment-persuading potential criminals not to act and reinforcing
the positive values in society-are, from my own perspective, the
most important goals a democratic government must achieve when
dealing with past human rights violations. I am convinced that one
of the most important moral obligations of a government conduct-
ing a transition to democracy is to prevent future human rights
violations. In order to do that, social repudiation of past human
rights violations is of great importance. It sends a message to po-
tential violators that the society grants no legitimacy to their ac-
tions and that it is willing to punish them.
The second reason, social reinforcement of the doctrine and
the values of human rights, is probably the most effective way to
prevent future violations. A culture that views such actions as high-
ly illegitimate makes it less probable that any political actor in
need of popular support would be tempted to violate them. If my
argument is correct, then the most important justification for
punishing human rights violators during a transition to a democ-
racy is that the criminal sanction best expresses society's moral
repudiation of the human rights violations. Punishment appears
then as a means and not as an end in itself.
I would certainly argue that the criminal sanction is the best
means, the best way to express and reinforce social repudiation.
Full disclosure of the truth may be considered a second best op-
tion because it demonstrates the moral repudiation of the viola-
tions and helps society remember the facts.
But perhaps I passed too quickly through the issue of rehabili-
tating the criminal. There is a related problem in human rights
violations, and it is of maximal importance. I refer to the task of
destroying the organization that was built up for violating human
rights. In the Chilean case, that organization was highly institu-
tionalized and was transformed into a department of the army
that today performs intelligence functions. Many, though not all,
of the officers that were involved in human rights violations are
now retired.
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I If one compares the situation of Chile with that of Argentina,
some paradoxes exist. The Argentineans made an attempt to pun-
ish the human rights violators. Military intervention threatening
democracy was successful enough to restrict punishment only to
the most important political figures, who were afterwards par-
doned. One could conclude that such a situation of partial justice
was not unlike the Chilean situation by referring to the previously
discussed goals of general prevention. But a great difference can
be seen in the changes that the democratic rulers could make in
the armed forces. As a faction of the Argentinean armed forces
struggled violently in support of their former leaders, Alfonsin
backed the loyal officers who were able to beat and retire the
most radical officers. But, in order to gain such loyalty, from the
moderate militaries, the government had to guarantee them that
its punishing policies would be restricted. Through such conces-
sions, the government cleaned the army of its most dangerous
people.
57
Other means are especially relevant in this effort to prevent
human rights violations, and the Commission addressed some of
them: the approval of international covenants of human rights, the
reinforcement of the internal legal system, and others. Two
seemed especially important in the Chilean situation, The first was
the reinforcement of the Chilean judiciary in its capacity to pro-
tect human rights. The report of the Commission extensively ana-
lyzes this fact.5" Shortly after announcing the report, the Presi-
dent stated that many judges had lacked moral courage in dealing
with human rights cases. The Supreme Court reacted very strongly
to both the Commission's analysis and the President's state-
ment. 9 A public discussion on the role of the judiciary followed,
and a compromise is now being achieved among the political
parties. Some changes will be made in the judicial structure to
reinforce its accountability to the people and its modernization,
while still protecting its independence.
Another preventive issue that the report addresses is the need
to reinforce the values of human rights in the culture of the
57 See Acufia, supra note 4.
58 REPoRT, supra note 1, at 843-52.
59 -The Supreme Court strongly criticized the report stating that the Commission
went beyond its mandate, that it unjustly criticized the role of the courts, and states that
the judges went as far as the law permitted them in the protection of human rights. A
complete version of the answer was published in EL MERCURSO, May 16, 1992.
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country. Some measures are now being undertaken to introduce
the topic of human rights in the curriculum of elementary
schools.'
B. Truth as a Starting Point for Reparation
As prevention of future humari rights violations is a very im-
portant moral obligation in the type of situations on which I am
focusing, another inescapable one is the need to compensate, to
the extent that it is possible, the suffering of the people most
severely affected. To comply with this obligation, the truth seems
indispensable.
To be sure, full compensation for the suffering of the victims
and their relatives is impossible, but that does not eliminate the
obligation to do whatever is possible. It is also true that compen-
sation should come directly from the wrongdoer. Although too
long to argue, I would make the case that in situations of past
human rights violations, an obligation arises for the state and for
all of society to involve itself in that reparative process.
It became clear early to the members of the Commission that
a full disclosure of the truth had enormous links with the begin-
ning of a reparative process and in the way we came to under-
stand it. The report frequently insists that a meaningful reparative
process must express a recognition of the truth, both by the state
and society. 'The reparative process presupposes the courage to
face the truth and to bring about justice: requires the generosity
to recognize the responsibilities and the attitudes of pardon in
order to achieve reconciliation."6' It is the recognition of the
truth that produces the three basic components of the compensa-
tory process upon which the Commission focused. These compo-
nents include the following: First, the disclosure of the truth and
the end of secrecy as reparation; second, expressions signaling the
recognition of the dignity of the victims and the pain of their
relatives; and third, efforts to increase the quality of life of the
relatives of the victims.
60 There is a bill that has been enacted by the Education Department (Ministerio
de Educacion), that must be approved by the Superior Council of Education (Consejo
Superior de Educacion), called "Bill of Fundamental Objectives and Minimal Contents for
the Elementary and High School Education." This bill establishes some minimal requisites
that all schools must fulfill. Among other things, this bill requires that students be taught
the importance of human rights.
61 REPORT, supra note 1, at 824.
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1. Truth as One of the Most Important Components of the
Reparative Process
The suffering of the relatives of those killed and missing is
the pain that anybody suffers when losing a beloved, yet it is
much more. Among those considerations, violence and secrecy are
of great relevance. As one relative stated:
My mother died i year ago, and I told myself that she was
finally at rest. My father died when I was young and I told
myself that that was going to make me mature and responsible.
Concerning the unjust and inexplicable death of my husband, I
can find no meaning.
6 2
Another said, "I had to explain to my five year old son that as
human beings destroyed the lives of the flowers and the animals,
sometimes human beings killed human beings."' If those words,
spoken to us by the relatives themselves may explain the extra
suffering of violent crimes, the following may express the extra
suffering because of secrecy: "I have been looking all around the
world. I have lost all I have because of the false information that
was given to us, all false. I need to rest and die peacefully. That is
why I need to know what happened to my son."" As another
stated, "Even if nothing else can be done, even if it may seem of
no use, I need to know why they killed him, what happened, what
was he doing, or how did they discover him. Anything that would
bring my mind to rest."' Secrecy affects not only the people who
need to know the truth about what happened, but it is also frus-
trates the need for social recognition. Other statements made by
the relatives may explain this need. As one relative stated:
I was taken- prisoner in the same truck as my husband. His
parents came to believe that I had denounced him. I could not
enter into their house during seventeen years. I was left alone,
hated by those who had killed him and scorned by those who
loved him. What happened in this country that people can
believe that a woman in love is capable of turning in her hus-
band?'
62 Id. at 767.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 771.
65 I&
66 Id. at 777.
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The truth is especially indispensable in the reparative process
of the relatives of those missing:
Until recently we were expecting to find him alive. Today we
are looking for his bones. This will never end ... this long
nightmare, from which I don't know any more if I can awake
because I forgot normal life .... I need to know what hap-
pened to him.... Every time I eat good food, I ask myself if
he is not hungry.
7
As I said before, although some progress was made by the Com-
mission, it was, to a large extent, incapable of finding this truth
about the missing people.
2. Recognition of the Dignity of the Victim and of Relatives'
Claims
Not only did the *relatives have to suffer the loss and the
secrecy, but they also had to suffer a long campaign where their
relatives were treated as the worst criminals.in the world. A news-
paper tabloid entitled, "They killed themselves like rats do,"68 ex-
plained that some people were killed by their comrades after
there had been an armed struggle between factions of the ex-
treme left. This version was then discovered to be a covert action
of the Chilean secret police to explain the deaths of people they
had previously arrested. 9 Again, some relatives said, "In the first
meeting we had with the governor he told us that our husbands
were criminals."70 Still another relative stated, "The newspapers
said that they were terrorists. With that, everybody justified their
murders.",7 1 This propaganda affected all the population, especial-
ly the children: "In the school I was told, 'your father was killed
because he was a politician.' We were called the small terror-
ists."7 2 As one person stated, "This was like the plague, both rela-
tives and friends turned their backs on us.
"7s
Following the general proposals of the Commission, some,
though few, symbolic acts have taken place both to remember the
dignity of the victims and to keep the social memory of the
67 Id. at 771.
68 Id. at 482-84, 610.
69 Id.
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facts. 74 The President" made a solemn declaration of the dignity
of the victims when he presented the report. Congress followed
with similar acts. Artists have been Working on symbols in the
cemetery and in other places. Public parks have been proposed. A
national symbol, like the impressive one that the United States has
built to keep alive the memory of the Vietnam war and its casual-
ties, is still lacking.
Not only a recognition of the facts and the victims is needed,
the relatives also need the social recognition that the battle they
have fought for many years was not a campaign of marxism .but
the expression of their deeper sentiments. For many years, they
were told lies and the official version was not that they were fight-
ing for truth and punishment, but that they were trying to subvert
the political order. The country has also benefitted from recogniz-
ing the enormous signs of life, solidarity, and compassion that can
be gained from examining the victims' organizations and move-
ment.
3. Compensating for the Quality of Life
The Commission also recommended that measures be taken
to compensate the relatives of the victims.7 First, the Commis-
sion recognized that there were many unresolved legal problems
for the families of those missing that the ordinary legislation could
not adequately resolve. Second, the Commission proposed that the
state freely provide physical and psychological treatment. As to the
psychological effects on the. families, much literature has been
written, and I am no specialist in that field. One of the psycholog-
ical effects that most impressed me while working in the Commis-
sion was the guilt that many spouses felt. There were no accepted
norms of how to live in such situations. Some spouses felt that
they had dedicated themselves "too much" to finding out about
their spouses and felt guilty because they had abandoned their
children who were also suffering. On the other hand, spouses had
moved away from their communities soon after their husband or
wife had disappeared and had dedicated themselves to raising
their children. These spouses were often viewed by themselves and
their children as traitors of the memory of their spouses because
74 Some actions have been taken to build a monument in the main graveyard of
Santiago, in honor of all those who died as victims of human rights violations during the
dictatorship.
75 REPoRT, supra note 1, at 827-35.
1992]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
they could have dedicated more time on behalf of the organiza-
tion or trying to find their relatives.
Another component of reparation that the Commission pro-
posed was to grant scholarships to the sons and daughters of the
victims. The legislature recently approved such a measure. Finally,
the Commission proposed that the state provide a pension for the
relatives of those considered victims. A law was finally approved in
February, 1992, granting state pensions to the parents, spouses,
and young sons and daughters of those considered victims by the
report.76
Although these social expressions of recognition have general-
ly been accepted and welcomed by the relatives, they insist that
justice should be achieved and that the truth about those missing
is absolutely indispensable in bringing about reconciliation. 7
C. Truth and Reconciliation
I will now turn my attention to a final and very important
point. It focuses on the issue of reconciliation. The Commission
was not only an entity created to disclose the truth, but it was also
created to bring about reconciliation. Reconciliation was an ex-
tremely important moral goal of the transitional government.
The relation between truth and reconciliation is evident. I will
only focus now on two components, or possible meanings of the
word reconciliation. One is depolarization, and the other deals
with the problematic issue of reconciling the people with their
history.
1. Reconciliation as De-Polarization
One of the biggest problems that frequently faces a govern-
ment during a period of transition to democracy is the one of a
polarized society. To bring about peace is then a necessary goal of
the new democratic government.
After the creation of the Commission, the military and the
political right publicly stated their fears that the truth would open
old wounds from the past that the country had successfully over-
come, and that it was going to create again (and now artificially)
a division among the Chileans. The government insisted that the
76 DIARo OnciAL. § 19.123 (1992).
77 See Sola Sierra, Speech as President of the Association of Relatives of the Disap-
peared Detainees (Jan. 1992).
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truth was a moral obligation and that the old wounds were not
healed but merely bandaged. Analogies to the situation of gan-
grene were frequently made.
Relatives and human rights groups recognized that the cre-
ation of the Commission was a good decision, a step in the right
direction, though they claimed that justice was also necessary.
They probably understood that the government could do no more
at that moment, and their demands for more forceful steps were
frozen. Viewing it from a political perspective, the creation of the
Commission produced an important result. It postponed for a year
a discussion that was viewed as highly dangerous for the stabiliza-
tion of democracy. The democratic government had time to prove
and reinforce its authority before facing one of its most difficult
topics. Finally, the issue of the creation of the Commission dis-
solved itself in a way that will be analyzed later.
The truth brought some relief and moral compensation for
the relatives of the victims. While insisting that it is not enough,
they have frequently recognized the work and report of the Com-
mission as being of enormous value. The relatives' strongest criti-
cism of the Commission is, of course, the old, largely unanswered
question of where are the missing?
If justice cannot be achieved, what else can be done? When
delivering the report, President Aylwin, in a solemn and emotional
moment of his speech,' said with a broken voice, "That is why I
endeavor, as the President of the Republic, to assume the repre-
sentation of all the nation in order to, in its name, acknowledge
accountability to the relatives of the victims."78 He continued to
"solemnly request the armed forces and all those who could have
participated in the excesses committed, to make gestures of recog-
nition of the suffering caused and to collaborate in diminishing
it." 79 His statements were widely commented upon and they were
followed by some similar words from leaders of the right-wing
parties. The President's speech was a major sign of reconciliation.
The second request was not followed. Full recognition of the
truth by the armed forces and some gestures to demonstrate this
on their part would have made an enormous change in the situa-
tion and could have transformed a situation of impunity into a
situation of pardon. As a mother of a victim once said, "I want to
78 EL MERCURIO, Mar. 5, 1991 (translated by the author of this Article).
79 Id.
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pardon; just tell me, whom should I 1pardon?" Even from a reli-
gious perspective, pardon requires the acknowledgement by and
repentance of the wrongdoer. Armies, however, except when they
are beaten, do not excuse themselves. The reaction of the Chilean
armed forces, and especially the reaction of the army was not,
unfortunately, an exception.
2. Reconciling People with Their History: Accepting the Truth
Finally, one can give another meaning to the word reconcilia-
tion. Men and women not only need to reconcile with each other,
but they also need to reconcile themselves as a people. They need
to reconcile their own history as a nation. History is their mirror
and, in order to reconcile themselves, they first need to recognize
themselves in that mirror.
The Chilean situation is difficult in this area. We like to see
ourselves as a highly civilized nation. It is part of our national
myth to call ourselves the "Englishmen of Latin America." We take
pride in our history of democratic stability, and we used to love to
make comparisons with other Latin-American countries that had a
worse record than ours. Our national anthem names Chile as the
asylum against oppression. Violence, torture, and massive human
rights violations were reserved for those. "banana republics," as we
used to call them with arrogance.
Soon after the delivery of the report, politicians started dis-
cussing responsibilities for the crisis of the democratic govern-
ment. Some talk addressed the issue of who was responsible for
human rights violations. But the discussion about how Chileans
involved themselves in sophisticated methods of torture, or how
Chileans could hate each other so much that such massive and
gross human rights violations could take place were never seriously
addressed. Chileans could not handle facing for too long the
worst part of our collective history, except at the superficial, politi-
cal level. The introductory chapters of the report were widely dis-
cussed, but an explanation of the facts described there was never
seriously attempted.
Perhaps it is too early to expect such a collective reaction.
The time for the artists and the psychiatrists' explanations will
come. Perhaps the report came too late. The country had already
known about the horrors by rumors and partial stories when noth-
ing or very little could have been done and when the only way to
stay alive was to continue minding your own business, while ac-
knowledging that something was happening to somebody else.
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A month after the report was made public and the media and
public opinion had focused widely upon it, somebody killed one
of the most influential young leaders of the right, Senator Jaime
Guzman. Attention shifted from the "past" to the dangers of the
future. Political violence and delinquency became the new issues.
As one politician said, the report of the Commission was buried
with Jaime Guzman. Yet, the report remains as a testimony of
horror.
To be sure, not wanting to face and discuss the issue any
more is not a frivolous reaction. It comes from a people who can
no longer suffer from the stories of horror that they have finally
come to believe. Yet, the question remains whether the country
has looked at these horrors enough to build a sufficiently strong
cultural barrier against the possibility of that happening again.

